



Local Representation in a Devolved Scotland and Wales: Guidance for Constituency and Regional Members

Lessons from the First Term

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Executive Summary

- Elections to both the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly use the Additional Member System, with constituency members supplemented by additional members to provide greater proportionality. The additional members are selected from eight regional lists in Scotland, and five regional lists in Wales. They are elected to represent a region as well as a party.
- For constituents this means greater choice. In addition to their constituency member they have a range of regional members they can approach. But for the elected members it means greater competition, and overlapping roles. Parliamentary authorities have had to issue guidance and statements on how members should behave.
- This ESRC research project asked members elected in 1999 about the relations in practice between the two classes of member, and whether the guidance is adequate. Its findings set out lessons for the members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) and Welsh Assembly (AMs) newly elected in May 2003.
- The Scottish Parliament introduced written guidance on relations between the two types of member. A majority of the MSPs surveyed did not view the guidance as adequate, with constituency members alleging that regional members target particular constituencies rather than serving the whole region. Many argued that at the very least existing guidance should be clarified and promoted more conscientiously as a form of regulation.
- Critical MSPs also proposed four possible ways of tightening regulation. First, MSPs should report to parliamentary authorities on their local representative work, and their allowances should be reviewed accordingly. Second, local expenditure of members should be audited to clarify between that engaged in

local representation, and that in party work. Third, stricter controls should be placed on regional members to prevent them from focusing on one constituency. Fourth, parliamentary authorities should be more willing to enforce and punish breaches of guidelines. Some MSPs also proposed open list candidacy for regional top-up seats to make additional members directly accountable to voters.

- At the same time, the majority of regional members pointed out the problems of more extensive regulation. Tighter regulation could actually exacerbate tensions, and open lists would not necessarily reward good local representatives. Alternative solutions included removing guidance altogether and allowing free-for-all competition. Such arguments suggested that any extension of guidance could prove difficult or undesirable. In considering reform there is a need to address strongly competing perspectives.
- The Welsh Assembly has not introduced any written guidance, and simply operates under statements of the presiding officer that all members are equal. Criticism of the inadequacy of current arrangements is even stronger than in Scotland. Labour constituency AMs are the most critical. There is, however, little awareness amongst Welsh AMs of the guidance introduced in Scotland. Before debating regulation Welsh AMs would do well to study the Scottish guidance as well as MSPs experience and suggested reforms.

Introduction

Elections to the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly in 1999 used the additional member system. In Scotland, 73 constituency members were elected by first past the post and 56 regional members from party lists. In Wales there were 40 constituency and 20 regional members. Both types of member could provide local representation for constituents, either at constituency level or in a region-wide jurisdiction.¹ Members accepted that constituents probably found this beneficial. It provided greater choice than at the UK level, where MPs had an exclusive local jurisdiction. At the devolved level, constituents now had a range of members that they could approach. However, for constituency members, who could claim special rights in representing constituents because they had been directly elected by them, it meant potentially unwelcome competition. Unsurprisingly, member relations over local representation became an issue of interest to all members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) and Welsh Assembly (AMs).

In 1999 the Scottish Parliament introduced guidance that prioritised constituent choice and asserted equality of status for members in representing constituents. It did, nevertheless, give some respect to the sensitivities of constituency members. In Wales there was a simple assertion of constituent choice and equality of status by the presiding officer. Key questions were how relations between members over local roles would develop and whether this guidance would be deemed adequate.

This paper presents research conducted between November 2002 and April 2003 on the perspectives of MSPs and AMs on how guidance operated and how members felt it should be reformed at the end of the first term. It takes Scotland as its principal focus as it was here that the debate was most developed. The paper first outlines the guidance adopted in 1999. Secondly, it discusses perceived problems that occurred. Thirdly, it reviews options for reform raised by members. A final section considers perspectives on member relations and guidance in Wales.

Guidance on Relationships between MSPs

In Scotland the 1999 election result immediately established constituency-regional member relations as politically controversial. The SNP and the Conservatives, strong in regional members, supported the principle of member equality to ensure that regional members were not marginalised. In contrast, Labour, which was almost exclusively represented in the constituencies, wished to privilege constituency MSPs to prevent

¹ The very usage of the term 'regional member' is of some importance. Many commentators use the terminology of 'list member' as they are drawn from party lists, or 'top-up member' because they top up chamber representation to make it more proportionally representative. However, both terms can be taken to emphasise their inequality of status vis a vis constituency members: that they are not directly elected by the people. Presiding officers in both Scotland and Wales have been careful to promote the term 'regional member' as this asserts equality of status with constituency members: that both do represent territorial jurisdictions.

regional members using local representation as a basis for electoral competition. Heated views came out in the debate over MSP allowances in June 1999 and an initial attempt was made to lay down guidance on the roles of the two types of member in the allowances code. The presiding officer, nevertheless, decided upon a fuller initiative. Following work by an all-party group and consultation with the party business managers, fuller guidance was introduced. This was passed in July 1999, was attached to the code of conduct and remains in force today.²

Overall, the guidance attempted to effect a compromise by marrying together the principle of equal status between members with provisions giving special respect for constituency members. To this end, the guidance was based initially on the four Reid principles, named after the deputy presiding officer, George Reid MSP, who chaired the all-party group. These asserted equal status for members in local representation. One guaranteed 'equal formal and legal status'. Another stated that all members 'have a duty to be accessible to the people of the areas for which they have been elected to serve and to represent their interests conscientiously'. The remaining two stipulated that members shall only deal with matters relating to the area in which they have been elected and that in casework the wishes of constituents and the constituency is 'of paramount importance'.

A fifth principle was added to assert mutual respect between representatives. It stated that 'MSPs should not misrepresent the basis on which they are elected or the area they serve'. Paragraph 14 asserted that MSPs should always describe themselves as the MSP for a given named constituency or region. Paragraph 15 asserted that constituency members must not describe themselves as the 'sole' member, nor regional members as the 'local' member for only a part of their region. Paragraph 16 asserted that members must serve all the constituents in their given constituency or region. Therefore, their constituency or region and not party should be indicated on all 'stationary and other items provided out of public funds including Parliament headed letter paper, surgery advertisements and business cards.' To further encourage mutual respect paragraph 10 then made a plea for co-operation between members. Political differences notwithstanding, at the very least 'MSPs may wish to contact one another, as a matter of courtesy, where they are involved or planning to become involved in a major local issue'.

Beyond this, the guidance focused on the protection of constituency members. Regional members were directed that they must not focus on one specific constituency, and that they must seek to avoid duplicating the work of constituency members. Hence, paragraph 17 asserted that 'regional members have responsibility to all those in the region for which they were elected'. They were expected to work in more than two constituencies. Work here was defined as holding surgeries, having dealings with local councils and other agencies, and responding to any constituent's inquiries. Regional

² For a more detailed discussion of these debates see B. Winetrobe, *Realising the Vision: A Parliament with a Purpose – An Audit of the First Year of the Scottish Parliament*, Constitution Unit, October 2001, pp30-38. For details of the Guidance see 'Relationships between MSPs: Guidance from the Presiding Officer, Annexe 5, *Code of Conduct*, Scottish Parliament. The guidance also deals with the relationships between MSPs and government and civic organisations.

members, nevertheless, did have the option of holding surgeries in their party's regional office (or in one of two offices in the bigger regions). Then when cases were taken up, paragraph 6 asserted that the regional member 'must notify the relevant constituency MSP at the outset unless the consent of the constituent is withheld'.

This compromise between the assertion of equal status and accommodation of constituency MSP sensitivities was reflected in decisions over salaries and allowances. On the one hand, the salaries for constituency and regional members were the same. Members' allowances were the same for the first regional member elected for each party in a region. On the other hand, every further regional member of a party elected in the same region would receive a lower level of allowances. This obliged parties with more than one regional member in any given region to pool resources.

The guidance provided for complaints to be made to the presiding officer and ultimately to the standards committee. There was, nevertheless, a reluctance to view it as a formal regulatory approach with real methods of enforcement. Rather, guidance was intended to establish conventions that would lead to peaceful coexistence of the two types of members. Policing of the guidance was envisaged as a process of informal education that might over time take the heat out of the initial partisan concerns.

Guidance on Relationships in Practice

How do members feel constituency-regional member relations worked in practice, and how useful do they feel the guidance was in the first term? Between 1999 and 2003 only three cases were taken before the standards committee.³ Nevertheless, it was apparent that members often made informal complaints to the presiding officer. Our findings now confirm that there was extensive criticism of member relations and the adequacy of the guidance seeking to inform them.

Table 1 shows that a majority of all MSPs believed the guidance to be inadequate. It is important to note though that this was based on heavy criticism from Constituency MSPs, 41.2% of whom disagreed that guidance was adequate and 35.3% of whom strongly disagreed. Not surprisingly, Labour MSPs were highly critical with 71.4% disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with the adequacy of guidance. Liberal Democrat MSPs were even more generally critical, with 75% disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with their

³ *Standards Committee 4th Report 2001, 13 July.* Cathie Craigie MSP against Andrew Wilson MSP under paras 14-16: that a regional member should not describe themselves as the 'local' MSP or use party logos on parliament headed letters circulated to constituents. Complaint upheld.

Standards Committee 9th Report 2001, 16 Nov Rhona Brankin MSP against Tommy Sheridan MSP under para 4: that no MSP should take up a constituency case outwith his or her constituency/region. Complaint upheld.

Standards Committee 10th Report 2002, 25 Nov Ian Jenkins MSP against Christine Grahame MSP. This had three bases: paras 6-10: that regional MSPs should notify constituency MSPs of casework they are conducting in their constituencies; paras 15-16: that regional members should not describe themselves as a 'local' member; and para 17: that regional members should serve all their region and work in more than two constituencies. Complaint upheld under para 6 and paras 14-15 but not paras 10 or 17.

adequacy. Regional members were more divided with no clear majority for or against. SNP and Conservative MSPs, with their focus among regional members, were the most supportive of the status quo, although even here there were large minorities who had reservations. Overall, the figures suggest that the partisan concerns marked out in 1999 had largely remained though there were substantial misgivings about guidance across both types of member and all the parties.

Table 1: Do you agree or disagree that guidelines currently in place relating to the differing responsibilities between constituency and regional MSPs are adequate?

Party	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree (%)	Neither Agree or Disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Strongly Disagree (%)
All Members	0.0	30.4	17.4	28.3	23.9
Constituency	0.0	11.8	11.8	41.2	35.3
Regional	0.0	41.4	20.7	20.7	17.2
Conservative	0.0	55.5	11.1	0.0	33.3
Labour	0.0	14.3	14.3	50	21.4
Liberal Democrats	0.0	25	0.0	25	50
SNP	0.0	29.4	29.4	23.5	17.6
SSP	0.0	100	0.0	0.0	0.0
Green	0.0	0.0	0.0	100	0.0

N=46, 17 Constituency, 29 regional

Constituency MSPs alleged a number of serious problems. First, the theoretical equality of members was at odds with their different obligations. Constituency MSPs found that they could barely cope with their constituency caseload on their members' allowances, and that it was an ever-present responsibility for the MSPs themselves. At the same time they believed that regional members were nowhere near as stretched. Their staff could be deployed much more strategically for purposes of electoral competition. Often, it is suggested, regional members did not actually hold casework surgeries and focused their work on issue campaigning in the local media. They were frequently accused of cherry picking the issues that they worked on. They could leave issues once the going got tough. Overall, it is suggested that regional members misused public money, with the SNP alleged to have pooled members' allowances to subsidise political campaigning.

Second, constituency MSPs alleged that many regional members did still in practice misrepresent themselves, implying that they were the 'local' member. Thirdly, and related to this, it is alleged that regional members paid only lip service to the guidance that they should provide a service in more than two constituencies. It was easily got round by holding a surgery in a couple of constituencies not usually visited just once a year. Instead many regional members did quite clearly focus their activity on particular constituencies, appearing to shadow the incumbent MSP in the hope of taking the seat from them at the 2003 election.

This appears to have been a phenomenon particularly associated with SNP and Conservative regional members. Obviously, given intense party competition, it was

logical for SNP members to target Labour-held seats. Motivations for Conservative regional members were more internally defined. By party rules candidates could not stand again for the regional list, the more likely basis for election, without having been selected as a constituency candidate first. Hence, the first priority for a regional member was to focus work in a specific constituency so as to win the constituency nomination from their own party. In this sense internal party procedure was a contributor to the problem of constituency targeting.

Fourthly, many constituency MSPs complained that the guidance by which regional members were required to notify them when they were taking up casework was simply not adhered to. The low level of contact witnessed by constituency MSPs with regional MSPs of other parties is shown in Table 2. 81.3 % of constituency MSPs felt that they had not very much or no contact from regional members about local casework. A flaw in enforcing the guidance becomes evident here. Constituency MSPs could not complain if they did not know about the casework upon which they should have been informed.

Finally, the hope that members from different parties may at least show some courtesy in contacting each other on issues of shared interest appears to have borne little fruit (see table 3). With the exception of perceptions among SNP constituency members, the picture emerges as one of highly competitive relations.

Overall, regional members were perceived by the majority of constituency members as a cuckoo in the nest. They could embark on local representation without accountability through the ballot box. Their accountability really only existed within parties as they looked ahead to the list selections for the 2003 elections, meaning that regional members who had actually been very poor local representatives could get re-elected at the behest of their party. Constituency members also generally complained at the poor enforcement of the guidance. In all three cases taken before the standards committee complaints were upheld and yet no sanctions were applied. Leniency at first offence and promises to improve were applied instead. MSPs were left with the impression that the parliamentary authorities were not prepared to get tough, and in a number of cases were deterred from making further complaints. . .

Table 2: If there is a regional list MSP from a different party as you in your electoral region do you ever have meetings/correspondence on ...? (Constituency MSPs responses)

	A great deal (%)	Quite a lot (%)	Some (%)	Not Very Much (%)	Not at all (%)
Issues raised by constituents	0.0	0.0	18.8	50	31.3
Issues raised by interest groups	0.0	0.0	12.5	62.5	25
Issues raised in community meetings	0.0	0.0	25	43.8	31.3

N=16

Table 3: Would you say that the relationship between yourself and regional list MSPs from other parties is? (Constituency MSP responses)

	Very Co-operative (%)	Fairly Co-operative (%)	Sometimes Co-operative / competitive (%)	Fairly Competitive (%)	Very Competitive (%)
All Constit.	0.0	6.3	25	31.3	37.5
Labour	0.0	8.3	25	33.3	33.3
Liberal Democrats	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100
SNP	0.0	50	50	0.0	0.0

N=16

Regional members refuted some of these accusations. Many claimed that they did laboriously adhere to the guidance, but that the provisions inserted to meet constituency MSP concerns made little practical sense. Commonly in answer to the question of whether a constituent wanted the regional member to keep their inquiry confidential from the local constituency member they said yes. Regional members would also assert that in practice most of their casework came from the area in which they lived, where they had often previously been local councillors and may have stood in constituency elections. They did not actively go out to target their local favoured constituency; rather constituents where they were best known targeted them. On the whole regional members had a much more positive view of the extent of their contact with constituency members. Table 4, nevertheless, still reveals that a majority of regional members had little or no contact with constituency members of other parties over issues of local representation.

Table 4: If there are constituency MSPs from different parties in your electoral region do you ever have meetings/correspondence on...? (Regional list MSP responses)

	A great deal(%)	Quite a lot(%)	Some(%)	Not very much(%)	Not at all(%)
Issues raised by constituents	0.0	7.4	33.3	29.6	29.6
Issues raised by interest groups	0.0	7.4	33.3	44.4	14.8
Issues raised in community meetings	0.0	3.7	33.3	40.7	22.2

N=27

Perspectives on Reform of Guidance

Local representation during the first term gave rise to much resentment, particularly among constituency members. Guidance was not perceived generally to have worked well. The most critical MSPs simply advocated the abolition of regional members. Others accepted the role of regional members but nevertheless sought reconsideration of members' rights and an enhancement of protection for constituency MSPs. Five principal options along these lines were advocated by MSPs:

Box 1 – Options for Reform

1. Parliamentary authorities should try and breathe new life into the existing guidance by clarifying it as a form of light regulation that was properly enforced. Some expected that greater compliance could be possible anyway once the Parliament had settled down. Reviving existing guidance, nevertheless, would still require a more concerted approach that inspired constituency MSPs with greater faith.
2. Review the work of constituency MSPs give consideration to increasing members' allowances to parity with Westminster MPs. At the same time, regional members could be required periodically to demonstrate to parliamentary authorities evidence of the casework that they had conducted across the region. This could be linked to consideration of whether regional members were genuinely providing a regional service and warranted members' allowances at the same rate as constituency members.
3. The auditing of the usage of allowances could be tightened up, incorporating clear distinctions between money spent on representative work and party work. Clear auditing rules could be helpful in clarifying independently the service to constituents provided by regional members that should be paid for from the public purse.
4. There should be tighter restrictions on regional members to ensure that they did not target constituencies. This could take the form of limiting surgeries to a maximum of one per month in any given constituency as well as insisting upon regular work in more than two constituencies by defining this requirement on the basis of relatively short specified periods of time. A regional member return to parliamentary authorities could also be required to clarify that casework was provided in more than two constituencies. Such requirements would, of course, have to take notice of confidentiality rights for constituents.
5. Parliamentary enforcement of any further regulation should be much tighter with punishments bringing transgressions to the notice of the public. This could help to ensure compliance. The common theme running through all of these options was the view that the Parliament move from a role of providing guidance to that of intervention and regulation. It was suggested that more work also could also be done in getting the media to understand the differences in the types of member so as to deter them from referring to regional members as 'local' members.

In addition, members often suggested a reform of the electoral system itself. In 1999 regional members were elected from closed party lists. To try and get round the perceived problem of regional members providing representation without accountability, consideration could be given to regional lists being open rather than closed. This would mean that regional members if re-selected by their parties would still need to be individually voted for from party lists at subsequent elections. This would give a powerful incentive to regional members to provide a genuine regional service.

Such options undoubtedly had a lot of support among constituency MSPs. Nevertheless, they carry a number of potential problems, often pointed out by regional members. Key among these is the probability that all of the regulatory options would increase rather than decrease tension between constituency and regional members. With a more formal

structure that clarified the scope for infringement one could expect many partisan tit-for-tat complaints to the standards committee.

Similarly, attempts to reform allowance arrangements on local work would provoke great resentment from regional members, and would stimulate intense partisan arguments over any method of justifying differential allowances. The paperwork involved and practical problems in deriving such a scheme would in itself be a strain on the Parliament. If an attempt was made to delve further into differences between local party and local representative work then these problems were likely to be compounded.

The question would inevitably come as to whether such regulation was really worth it to assuage the sensitivities of constituency MSPs, who were largely derived from the parties which had actually introduced the additional member electoral system in the first place. Should they not learn to live with an electoral system of their own making? Equally, the open list proposal is not without its problems. Open lists are often held to help 'celebrity' candidates rather than genuine politicians. In this as in other aspects of the reform debate, there are no easy answers.

At the same time, those who felt existing guidance was perfectly adequate, notably regional members, suggested that reform if anything should focus on reducing its contents. Constituency MSPs who were sanguine about the problems of competition were often sympathetic. They were certainly sceptical that greater regulation could ever work as it was hard to devise rules to stop elected politicians from competing with each other. Was it right to do so anyway? Such sentiments supported an argument that relations could only really settle down if equality of status was simply accepted and constituency members learned to live with competition. Such consensus has occurred in the German additional member system. It could be argued that the only real way forward is to nurture the same here.⁴

Such arguments suggest that any extension of guidance could prove difficult and undesirable. Hence, pressures for greater regulation from members in the first term have to be viewed critically. Nevertheless, there remain dangers of not taking resentment among constituency MSPs seriously. In considering further public debate of guidance there is a need to address strongly competing perspectives.

Wales

In Wales in 1999 there was little debate on constituency-regional member relations. The Presiding Officer, Dafydd Elis-Thomas, simply asserted that all members were equal, and that members' allowances would be identical between constituency and regional members. This was accepted without much response. While this meant that there was no written guidance as such, in effect it established a working convention that largely reflected the Reid principles in Scotland. Of course, this meant that there was no attempt

⁴ This comparative argument is made in T.Lundberg 'Putting a human face on proportional representation: early experiences in Scotland and Wales' *Representation*, Spring 2002, 38, 4, 271-283

to balance the principle of equal status with some protection of constituency AM sensitivities. Hence, Wales experienced a different context to the development of relations in the first term. What was the result?

Problems in relations between different types of members have been played down by parliamentary authorities.⁵ It is evident, nevertheless, that the absence of much guidance on relations between constituency and regional members brewed significant resentments. Table 5 shows that a clear majority of all AMs believed that guidance was inadequate. Constituency AMs felt the strongest about it, with 66.7% disagreeing or strongly disagreeing that guidance was adequate. Equally, Labour AMs were prominent critics, with 40% disagreeing and 46.7% strongly disagreeing.

There was, however, also a majority even among regional AMs that guidance was inadequate. A third of Plaid Cymru members and a half of Conservative and Liberal Democrat AMs agreed that there was a problem. The figures suggest that the subject of guidance, as in Scotland, was predominantly an issue for Labour Constituency AMs. Nevertheless, with perhaps the exception of Plaid Cymru, there appears to have been something approaching a cross-party consensus that the matter should at least be discussed and some reform considered.

Table 5: Do you agree or disagree that the guidelines currently in place relating to the differing responsibilities between list and constituency AMs are adequate?

	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree (%)	Neither Agree nor Disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Strongly Disagree (%)
All members	3.1	18.8	15.6	28.1	34.4
Constituency	0.0	14.3	19.0	23.8	42.9
Regional	9.1	27.3	9.1	36.4	18.2
Labour	0.0	6.7	6.7	40.0	46.7
Plaid Cymru	0.0	33.3	33.3	11.1	22.2
Conservative	25.0	0.0	25.0	25.0	25.0
Lib Democrat	0.0	50.0	0.0	25.0	25.0

N=32, Constituency 21, Regional 11

In examining the causes of criticism it should be stressed that some regional members had of their own volition taken an approach which would have complied both with the spirit and the letter of the 1999 Scottish guidance. Some regional members were clearly assiduous in having a regional office open all week, holding surgeries in different parts of their region and considering it a courtesy to check with constituents that they did not wish to see their constituency AM instead.

⁵ In evidence to the Richard Commission reviewing the future powers and electoral arrangements of the National Assembly for Wales, Lord Elis Thomas said simply that he was ‘aware of turf wars which have occasionally erupted between constituency and regional members on representational matters’.

However, there does again appear to have been a gap between the asserted equality of member status and the differences in their local casework obligations. Few regional members claimed a workload as great as constituency members, allowing a widespread Labour AM perception that members' allowances had in effect been a major subsidy to the political campaigning of Plaid Cymru. Furthermore, a number of practices were evident that would be highly irregular judged by the criteria of the Scottish guidance (Box 2).

Box 2 – Problems in Practice in Wales

- Regional member surgery leaflets, paid for out of Assembly allowances, exhibited a variety of practices in how they presented the member. Some quite clearly sought to represent the regional AM as the local member. Others presented as examples of propriety had the party affiliation of the member prominently displayed.
- In the absence of requirements to provide a 'regional' coverage some regional members made little secret of their focus on one constituency. Here, Plaid Cymru party competition with Labour was an important factor. Equally, internal candidate selection procedures in the Conservative Party again encouraged a primary focus on an individual constituency.
- Related to this, it was evident that there was very little contact between regional members and constituency members of other parties on local casework and local issues raised by interest groups and in community meetings.

Table 6 suggests that the overwhelming majority of AMs had little contact with members of other parties. The complete absence of contact over individual casework in two thirds of cases is particularly noteworthy. Equally, there was little perception of co-operation on issues of collective interest, although interestingly it was still higher than in Scotland. This was particularly so with Plaid Cymru AMs (see Table 7).

Table 6: If there is a regional list AM from a different party as you in your electoral region do you ever have meetings/correspondence on ...? (Constituency AMs responses)

	A great deal (%)	Quite a lot (%)	Some (%)	Not at all (%)	Not very much (%)
Issues raised by constituents	0.0	0.0	4.8	28.6	66.7
Issues raised by interest groups	0.0	0.0	9.5	47.6	42.9
Issues raised in community meetings	0.0	0.0	4.8	47.6	47.6

N=21

Table 7: Would you say that the relationship between yourself and regional list AMs from other parties is? (Constituency AM responses)

	Very Co-operative (%)	Fairly Co-operative (%)	Sometimes Co-operative / competitive (%)	Fairly Competitive (%)	Very Competitive (%)

Constituency	5.0	10.0	30.0	20.0	35.0
Labour	7.7	0.0	23.1	30.8	38.5
Plaid Cymru	0.0	50.0	50.0	0.0	0.0
Lib Democrat	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	66.6

N=20

Note: The one Conservative constituency AM did not respond.

Regional members assert a more positive view of the extent of their contact with constituency members of other parties. Table 8, nevertheless, still reveals that a majority of regional members had little or no contact with constituency members over issues of local representation.

Table 8: If there are constituency AMs from different parties in your electoral region do you ever have meetings/correspondence on...? (Regional list AM responses)

	A great deal (%)	Quite a lot (%)	Some (%)	Not at all (%)	Not very much (%)
Issues raised by constituents	0.0	0.0	27.3	45.5	27.3
Issues raised by interest groups	0.0	18.2	9.1	45.5	27.3
Issues raised in community meetings	0.0	18.2	9.1	36.4	36.4

N=11

Overall, the Welsh case provides grim reading for members in Scotland who argue that in the short term at least it may be better to reduce guidance. The percentage of members judging the more limited guidance in Wales to be inadequate was more than 10% higher than in Scotland. Nevertheless, in terms of developing perspectives on change in Wales there has been little separate debate. There was, for example, widespread ignorance among AMs of the fact that parliamentary authorities in Scotland had introduced guidance. Hence, discussion of the Scottish experience and the options for change advocated there may provide a starting point for fuller discussion. Such discussion, however, needs to be mindful of the problems of regulation as much as non-regulation.

Conclusion

The introduction of the additional member system with devolution engineered a mini-revolution in local representation in both Scotland and Wales. It brought benefits both in scope and choice for constituents. It nevertheless raised unprecedented potential problems in relations between different types of elected member and the need for guidance from parliamentary authorities. The paper's review of the first term makes two broad contributions. First, it has sought to clarify the problems in relations between

constituency and regional members when they were from different parties and the adequacy of parliamentary guidance. Secondly, it reviews member perspectives on how they believed guidance could be reformed, that strike varying balances between the equality principle and privileging constituency members. Members elected in the 2003 elections may take different views but in considering future arrangements the experience of devolution's first parliamentarians' should be of considerable value.

About the Research

The data in this paper is based on a postal survey conducted of all members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) and National Assembly of Wales (AMs) in Autumn-Winter 2002-2003. Response rates were as follows:-

MSPs (35.6%). Ns = 46. Labour 14; SNP 18; Conservative.9, Liberal Democrat 3, Socialist 1, Green 1.
AMs: (53.3%). Ns = 32. Labour;15; Plaid Cymru: 9; Conservative 4; Liberal Democrat 4.
Survey research was complemented by semi-structured interviews with MSPs and AMs.

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