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2. DEVOLUTION: THE FORLORN HOPE
A 'Europe of the Regions' became a rallying cry during the 1990s for interest groups committed to more participative and more decentralised forms of governance. Naturally enough, regional interest groups, in particular the German Lander, were among the most prominent supporters of a conception of Europe in which the powers of the nation state were supposedly seeping away in two directions - upwards to the European Union as a result of an ineluctable process of ever-closer integration and downwards to the regions as a result of the growing trend towards devolution. In this conception regional governments were thought to be bypassing their national governments in an attempt to forge direct alliances with the European Commission. Flattered by this attention, some Commission officials appear to have encouraged this kind of thinking, not least because it elevated the status of the EU and diluted the role of the nation state.
Significantly, no one at the conference expressed much sympathy for the traditional conception of a 'Europe of the Regions': Participants argued that it was neither an accurate reflection of the past nor a useful guide to the future. It was accepted that the notion of a 'Europe of the Regions' had played a positive role during the debates around the Maastricht Treaty, and then largely as a metaphor for a decentralised Union in which the principle of subsidiarity is treated more seriously. Having acknowledged this, the Wilton Park conference moved on to consider more substantive issues regarding regions and regionalism in an enlarged EU. A pertinent presentation on this theme came from Joe Painter (Durham University), who reported on an ESRC-funded project on Regional Identity and European Citizenship. Among other things he argued that regions could be demarcated in different ways, including:
• Statistical regions - units for collation of data. • Administrative regions - products of administrative decentralisation. • Political regions - devolved or autonomous government. • Cultural regions - distinctive ways of life or feelings of belonging. • Economic regions - functional integration of economic relations.
There was no necessary fit between these different categories of region, argued Painter. He tended to favour a cultural demarcation of regions as an antidote to the instrumental use of regions for economistic ends. Although he accepted that an enhanced regional tier in the EU might have positive benefits, he was inclined to stress 'the risks of regionalism', meaning the dangers of cultural introversion, regional chauvinism and closure to outsiders. These outcomes could have negative effects, because economic dynamism was more likely to flow from cultural diversity and openness to the outside world rather than cultural homogeneity and social closure. This triggered a lively debate as to whether regionalism was a benign or a malign force, a question which everyone eventually agreed could only be answered when the social or political programme of a regionalist movement was defined. Another question to emerge concerned the fact that regionalism was often associated with multiple not singular identities. The question of multiple identities lies at the heart of The Isles, a controversial historical reinterpretation of the UK by Norman Davies, in which the author dedicates the book to his grandfather, who was described as being:
'English by birth, Welsh by conviction, Lancastrian
by choice, British by chance' (Davies:1999) Other participants argued that regionalism, whilst it could assume parochial and chauvinistic forms is very often correlated with pro-EU sentiments, so much so that regional devolution and supra-national integration tend to go hand in hand, which suggests that regionalism in Europe need not be an introverted phenomenon. Participants from Central and Eastern Europe were keen to emphasise the risks and opportunities of regionalism in the applicant countries. In Romania it was said that the country was divided into eight 'economic regions' to facilitate its entry into the EU, but the new regional boundaries were purely artificial, having no relation to the cultural boundaries of history. In stark contrast, Poland decided to utilise cultural and historical identities when it created 16 regions to help to steer the country to its post-communist future. Most participants felt that the 'Polish model' offered a more robust basis for a workable territorial architecture. The risks of regionalism were illustrated by the case of Belgium, which could become the first EU member state to break-up under the weight of its regional tensions. It is often argued that Flanders is no longer prepared to subsidise Wallonia to the tune of some BF 200 billion per annum, an economic gap which was compounded by linguistic, political and cultural differences. The question was posed, but not answered whether Flanders had a democratic right to self-determination. Few would comfortable about sanctioning the break-up of existing member states - not because they were insensitive to the claims of subsidiarity, but because they were sensitive to the claims of solidarity. This tension, which reflects the age-old tension between democracy and equality, is addressed below in section four. For all the risks associated with regionalism, participants were nevertheless keen to emphasise the opportunities of devolving power. For example, a number of potential benefits could flow from democratic devolution, including: • Empowering local knowledge • Allowing policies to be designed and delivered according to local circumstance, so as to facilitate economic development or cultural identitity • Provide more accountable governance systems in which decision-making is close those affected, in keeping with the principle of subsidiarity The case for devolving power to regional and local levels was put by Martine Buron, the Mayor of Chateaubriant, in a presentation on the Committee of the Regions (CoR). Created by the Maastricht Treaty, which came into force in November 1993, the CoR is a consultative body of the EU and it consists of 222 representatives of sub-national authorities. The CoR was the official response to local and regional demands for representation within the EU and it is the only institutional voice for sub-national levels in the Union (3) . Aside from giving its opinions on a wide array of the subjects, the CoR's main aim is to ensure that the principle of subsidiarity is properly applied in the EU. To strengthen the CoR in the future, said Ms Buron, the following reforms would be necessary: • Making the CoR an EU institution on a par with the Commission, the Council and the Parliament • Lengthening CoR members' term of office from 4 to 5 years so as to align it with European Parliament mandates • Fixing the maximum number of CoR members at 350 in the context of enlargement, · Requiring the Council and the Commission to explain why they did not follow CoR opinions in the cases of mandatory referrals. In the debate which followed the democratic credentials of the CoR were questioned, given the fact that some of its members are appointed rather than elected. It was admitted that this was a controversial issue because the CoR prided itself on being a democratic body, a status which was clearly compromised by the fact that some of its members were appointed. In the future it would be necessary to ensure that all CoR members were there as (indirectly) elected members. It was also conceded that the CoR suffered from internal divisions, especially as between regional versus local members for example. Should the CoR not be more ambitious in its demands? Why, for example, was the CoR not seeking a direct role for regions in the Treaties? The demand for Treaty status totally ignored the enormous variations in structures and powers at the sub-national level in the EU. It may be a serious proposition from the standpoint of the German Lander, but certainly not for other states, some of which do not have any regional structures at all. Furthermore, Ms Buron said, CoR members should put their own national house in order before they raised their sights in the EU: There is a national fight to fight and the CoR must make a bigger effort to remind our national politicians that we exist and that we want to be consulted and associated in decision-making, in each of the respective member states. If we get this right (including the right to have a say in the preparation and enhancement of European policies and regulations) then our sub-national authorities can get more influence than if they seek to engage directly in the EU.
The support of European citizens will only be forthcoming if European integration takes place in a context in which powers and responsibilities are transparent. The principle of subsidiarity is a political principle which is constitutional in nature, and its incorporation in the Treaties requires Member States and the relevant institutions to choose the most effective and proportionate level for decision-making. The principle of subsidiarity must therefore guarantee both regional rights and local autonomy. This requires amending the Treaty provisions so that Article 5 of the EC Treaty refers specifically to local and regional authorities by virtue of the powers devolved to them by the national laws of Member States… Since its creation the CoR has wanted to launch a debate about the distribution of powers in order to bring citizens closer to European decision-making centres and to ensure that not only the powers of local and regional authorities are protected but that these authorities are also effectively involved in the EU's work. In addition, effective application of the principle of subsidiarity, which takes account of the sub-national level, would help to maintain the diversity of Europe's identities and cultures, which are a particular asset' (CoR: 2000). The Lille Declaration calls for the principle of subsidiarity to be clarified. But it is important to understand that, up until now, the lack of clarity surrounding this principle is not an accident. On the contrary, ambiguity has served a purpose: this being that 'subsidiarity' can mean whatever one wants it to mean. For a principle which supposedly lies at the very heart of the EU's multi-level polity, however, this beggars belief. Pursuing the issue of diversity at the sub-national level, Charlie Jeffery (University of Birmingham) addressed the theme "One Size Does Not Fit All: Regional Differen-tiation and European Integration". Two arguments in particular stood out. First, that the German Länder were the real driving force behind the notion of a 'Europe of the Regions' because it served their purpose. This was to protect and promote the powers of the regional tier, sometimes called the 'third tier', powers which they feared were being transferred to the EU. Having experienced the 'tame municipal politics' of the Committee of the Regions, however, the Länder recoiled and decided to put more effort into their domestic agendas because, "if you are in the Council of Ministers, why bother with the Committee of the Regions?". With respect to the German Länder he concluded by saying "Germany is a model for everything we should not do, since it is designed to produce common standards, which is hardly what we want in the EU". His second key argument was that the CoR could not be expected to co-ordinate the sub-national level throughout the EU because this level is too incoherent and diverse, with the result that the CoR frequently produces "compromise without consensus". Compared with ten years ago, he argued, regions were now pursuing a more mature agenda in the EU - with fewer grand gestures and more pragmatic efforts to enhance their influence through national structures, EU structures and cross-border alliances. In other words, the regions had begun to grow up, a sentiment which met with widespread agreement among participants. A final presentation on this theme, by Denis MacShane (Parliamentary Private Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London), posed the question as to whether a "Europe of the Regions" was more yesterday's answer than a future prospect. His key argument was that the regional dimension was merely one of a number of different European identities (there is a Europe of States, a Europe of EU institutions, a Europe of nations and a Europe of Cities). Hence it was not appropriate to single out any one of these for special attention. Having said that, there is a strong case for the UK government's position on the EU, namely that instead of a United States of Europe, it supports a United Europe of States. In other words, inter-governmentalism is the way forward for the EU after enlargement because people tend to be very federal until they are asked to give up some powers. In his view these constitutional issues were not as important as the substantive issues on which the British Government wanted the EU to focus - like employment, enlargement and the environment. When asked what the role of regions might be in this scenario, he replied by saying that the implementation of subsidiarity will vary from country to country, as it is a national rather than a European responsibility. (3) Other institutional expressions include the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR/CCRE) - website http://www.ccre.org/ and Eurocities - website http://www.eurocities.org/ new website scheduled to be launched in February 2001. Go to Section 3 : Development: The Limit and Scope of Regional Action Back to Contents page for this document
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